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O P I N I O N 
   
 
RENDELL, Circuit Judge: 
 
 Early one morning, Petitioners Erick Geovany Yoc-Us 
and Luis Calel-Espantzay were traveling in a van that was 
stopped for speeding by a Pennsylvania state trooper.  During 
the course of the stop, the trooper discovered that Petitioners 
were undocumented aliens.  The trooper detained them and 
called Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”), who 
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interviewed and fingerprinted Petitioners and took them into 
custody.  In the civil removal proceedings that followed, 
Petitioners argued that the stop violated the Fourth 
Amendment and that the evidence of their alienage should be 
suppressed.  The Immigration Judge (“IJ”) and the Board of 
Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) were unpersuaded.  While the 
Supreme Court has held that the Fourth Amendment does not 
require suppression of evidence in civil removal proceedings 
where the purportedly offending conduct by federal agents 
was neither egregious nor widespread, this case presents a 
different context, namely, a state trooper’s conduct rather 
than that of a federal officer.  Accordingly, we must consider 
whether this difference leads to a different result. 
 
I.  
A. 
 Petitioners are undocumented aliens from Guatemala 
who have lived and worked in New York since 2008.  They 
were traveling in a van with eight other men, returning to 
New York from Georgia.  According to declarations 
submitted by Petitioners and other passengers, Pennsylvania 
State Trooper Luke C. Macke pulled the van over for 
speeding between 7:40 and 8:00 in the morning.  Petitioners 
were not driving the van when this happened and were 
instead asleep in the back of the van.  When Macke 
approached the driver of the vehicle, he asked for his license 
and registration.  Petitioners allege that the driver did not 
have his license with him, but he gave Macke his social 
security number and offered to call his wife to get his driver’s 
license number.  The owner of the van, who was seated in the 
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front passenger seat, gave Macke his own license and 
registration. 
 Petitioners allege that “[i]nstead of going back to his 
vehicle to check [either the van owner’s or the driver’s] 
information . . . [,] [Macke] then went to the side passenger 
door of the van, opened the door and said [to the eight 
passengers in the back], ‘let me see your immigration papers, 
work permit, visa, passport and ID.’”  Calel-Espantzay A. 
211.  Petitioners claim that they did not have any documents 
to give him, and their declarations do not indicate that they 
verbally offered him any information.  Contrary to this 
account, however, the Records of Deportable/Inadmissible 
Alien (“Forms I-213”) produced by the Government purport 
that, in response to Macke’s inquiry, the Petitioners admitted 
that they were citizens of another country.  According to the 
Forms I-213, Macke contacted ICE at approximately 8:30 
a.m. and “stated that he encountered nine individuals during a 
traffic stop who claimed to be citizens of; [sic] Guatemala, 
Mexico, El Salvador and Ecuador.”  Id. at 245.  Macke issued 
citations to the driver of the car at 8:57 a.m.1  Id. at 177–78. 
 
  Petitioners allege that Macke ordered them to drive 
the van to a nearby rest stop and, once there, positioned his 
own car so that Petitioners’ van could not be moved.  They 
claim that he ordered them to turn off the van and remain in it 
and that “[h]e then began to interrogate [them] about [their] 
immigration status,” again “asking to see [their] work 
permit[s], passports, visas and social security card[s].”  Id. at 
211.  Between the time they reached the rest stop and the time 
ICE agents arrived, Petitioners allege that Macke would not 
                                              
1 The citations were issued for speeding and for operating a 
vehicle with a suspended or revoked license. 
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allow them to leave the van to use the bathroom, would not 
allow them food or water, and would not let them turn the air-
conditioning on in the van even though the weather was 
“humid.”  Id. at 211–12.  They state that they could not leave 
and that they felt as though they had to answer his questions.  
They also “d[id] not know why [Macke] kept [them] there 
except for the fact that [they] all look Hispanic.”  Id. at 212. 
 
 According to the Forms I-213, ICE agents arrived at 
approximately 9:30 a.m., between an hour and a half and two 
hours after the alleged time of the initial stop.  The ICE 
agents conducted interviews of Petitioners and other 
passengers and fingerprinted them.  The Government’s 
evidence asserts that all “freely stated that they were not 
citizens of the United States[,] had illegally entered the 
United States . . . [, and] were not in possession of any 
immigration document that would allow them to remain the 
United States lawfully.”  Id. at 245.  They were then 
handcuffed and transported to an immigration office, where 
they remained for approximately three hours, until they were 
moved to a local county prison. 
 
B. 
The Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”) 
served Petitioners with a Notice to Appear Form, alleging that 
they were subject to removal pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 
1182(a)(6)(A)(i).  Petitioners moved to suppress any evidence 
of their alienage obtained as a result of the stop, arguing that 
it had been discovered through a violation of their Fourth 
Amendment rights.  Because the Government would not be 
able to meet its burden of proving alienage without this 
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evidence, Petitioners also moved to terminate the removal 
proceedings. 
Before the scheduled removal hearing was held, the IJ 
denied Petitioners’ motion and declined their request for an 
evidentiary hearing.  Citing Lopez-Gabriel v. Holder, 653 
F.3d 683 (8th Cir. 2011), the IJ concluded that the 
exclusionary rule does not apply to intersovereign situations 
where a violation was committed by a sovereign other than 
the one involved in the civil proceeding.  The IJ also credited 
the Government’s evidence and found that Petitioners’ 
“complaint against the ICE officers lacks any corroborating 
evidence” and only amounts to “unsubstantiated allegations.”  
Yoc-Us A. 135.  The IJ discredited Petitioners’ account that 
Macke stopped them because of their Hispanic appearance, 
finding that their claim was “refuted by evidence which 
shows that their vehicle was stopped for excessive speed.”  
Id.  Finally, with regard to Macke’s alleged misconduct, the IJ 
concluded that the Immigration Court “lacks authority to 
provide any remedy for a separate sovereign’s misconduct.”  
Id.  In a subsequent decision, the IJ ordered Petitioners 
removed from the United States to Guatemala. 
 
A single-member panel of the BIA affirmed the IJ’s 
ruling in substantially identical opinions for each Petitioner.  
Citing INS v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032 (1984), the BIA 
stated that the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule only 
applies to removal proceedings where “there are egregious 
Fourth Amendment violations that transgress Fifth 
Amendment notions of fundamental fairness, undermining the 
probative value of the evidence.”  Id. at 4; Calel-Espantzay A. 
3.  The BIA “discerned no clear error” in the IJ’s findings.  
Yoc-Us A. 3; Calel-Espantzay A. 2.  It agreed with the IJ that 
Macke conducted a lawful stop and that Petitioners failed to 
8 
 
show that Macke or the ICE agents engaged in egregious 
conduct.  Because it found that Petitioners did not establish a 
prima facie case for suppression, the BIA concluded that an 
evidentiary hearing was unnecessary.  Lastly, the BIA 
rejected Petitioners’ claim that this type of violation was 
“widespread,” finding that they failed to present any 
supporting evidence.  This petition for review followed. 
 
II. 
 The BIA had jurisdiction to review the IJ’s order of 
removal and order denying Petitioners’ motion for 
suppression and termination pursuant to 8 C.F.R. § 
1003.1(b)(3).  We have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 
1252(a)(1). 
 
 Because the BIA issued its own opinion, we review its 
decision rather than that of the IJ.  Moreno v. Att’y Gen., 887 
F.3d 160, 163 (3d Cir. 2018) (citation omitted).  However, to 
the extent that the BIA “deferred to or adopted” the IJ’s 
reasoning, we evaluate the decision of the IJ.  Cadapan v. 
Att’y Gen., 749 F.3d 157, 159 (3d Cir. 2014).  We review 
questions of law de novo, subject to the principles of 
deference articulated in Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural 
Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984).  Id.  
We review factual findings “to ensure that they are supported 
by substantial evidence from the record considered as a 
whole, and we will reverse based on a factual error only if 
any reasonable fact-finder would be ‘compelled to conclude 
otherwise.’”  Huang v. Att’y Gen., 620 F.3d 372, 379 (3d Cir. 
2010) (citing Espinosa–Cortez v. Att’y Gen., 607 F.3d 101, 
106 (3d Cir. 2010) and quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B)). 
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III. 
Petitioners urge that their motion to suppress should 
have been granted based on the exclusionary rule.  They 
argue that the exclusionary rule should apply when the 
offending conduct was committed by state or local law 
enforcement, rather than federal agents.  However, even if we 
do not agree that the exclusionary rule should apply here, they 
urge that the evidence should still be suppressed pursuant to 
our holding in Oliva-Ramos v. Attorney General, 694 F.3d 
259 (3d Cir. 2012), as the fruit of an egregious or widespread 
Fourth Amendment violation.  Alternatively, Petitioners 
contend that they should have been entitled to an evidentiary 
hearing on their motion and ask us to remand this matter to 
the IJ to conduct such a hearing. 
 
A. 
 As a threshold matter, we consider whether Petitioners 
made a prima facie showing that their detention violated the 
Fourth Amendment and that the evidence they seek to 
suppress was the fruit of that constitutional violation.  Even 
though Petitioners are not United States citizens, the relevant 
Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights apply to them.  
Wong Wing v. United States, 163 U.S. 228, 238 (1896). 
 
 The constitutionality of a seizure that is not an arrest 
depends upon “the reasonableness in all the circumstances of 
the particular governmental invasion of a citizen’s personal 
security.”  Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 19 (1968).  “[A] search 
which is reasonable at its inception may violate the Fourth 
Amendment by virtue of its intolerable intensity and scope,” 
the latter of which “must be strictly tied to and justified by the 
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circumstances which rendered its initiation permissible.”  Id. 
at 18–19 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).  
Therefore, in determining reasonableness, we consider 
“whether the officer’s action was justified at its inception, and 
whether it was reasonably related in scope to the 
circumstances which justified the interference in the first 
place.”  Id. at 20. 
 
 In the context of traffic stops, the Supreme Court has 
made clear that “the tolerable duration [of the stop] is 
determined by the seizure’s ‘mission’—to address the traffic 
violation that warranted the stop and attend to related safety 
concerns.”  Rodriguez v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 1609, 1614 
(2015) (citations omitted).  “A seizure justified only by a 
police-observed traffic violation, therefore, ‘become[s] 
unlawful if it is prolonged beyond the time reasonably 
required to complete th[e] mission’ of issuing a ticket for the 
violation.”  Id. at 1612 (quoting Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 
405, 407 (2005)) (alterations in original) (holding that a seven 
or eight minute extension of a traffic stop to conduct a dog 
sniff is unreasonable if the officer did not have reasonable 
suspicion of criminal activity).  “To prolong a stop beyond 
that point, the officer must have acquired reasonable 
suspicion during the mission to justify further investigation.”  
United States v. Clark, 902 F.3d 404, 410 (3d Cir. 2018) 
(citing Rodriguez, 135 S. Ct. at 1615).  With regard to what 
questions an officer may ask, the Supreme Court has stated 
that “inquiries into matters unrelated to the justification for 
the traffic stop . . . do not convert the encounter into 
something other than a lawful seizure, so long as those 
inquiries do not measurably extend the duration of the stop.”  
Arizona v. Johnson, 555 U.S. 323, 333 (2009). 
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 A state or local officer’s conduct during a stop is 
further limited in the immigration context.  In Arizona v. 
United States, the Supreme Court raised two concerns with 
“[d]etaining individuals solely to verify their immigration 
status.”  567 U.S. 387, 413 (2012).  First, because “it is not a 
crime for a removable alien to remain present in the United 
States,” id. at 407 (citation omitted), “the usual predicate for 
an arrest is absent” where an officer stops someone based on 
possible removability, id.; see also Sanchez v. Sessions, 885 
F.3d 782, 789 (4th Cir. 2018) (“[W]hen, absent federal 
direction or authorization, a state or local officer detains or 
arrests someone based solely on a civil immigration violation, 
the officer violates that individual’s Fourth Amendment right 
to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures.” 
(emphasis in original)); Melendres v. Arpaio, 695 F.3d 990, 
1000 (9th Cir. 2012) (“[T]he Fourth Amendment does not 
permit a stop or detention based solely on unlawful 
presence.”); Almeida-Amaral v. Gonzales, 461 F.3d 231, 236 
(2d Cir. 2006) (holding that the petitioner’s Fourth 
Amendment rights were violated where the arresting officer 
did not have a valid justification for the stop).  Even if an 
initial stop is lawful, “delay[ing] the release of some 
detainees for no reason other than to verify their immigration 
status” would “raise constitutional concerns.”  Arizona v. 
United States, 567 U.S. at 413 (citing Arizona v. Johnson, 555 
U.S. at 333).  Second, detention based only on removability 
“would disrupt the federal framework” established by 
Congress.  Id.  “Congress has put in place a system in which 
state officers may not make warrantless arrests of aliens based 
on possible removability except in specific, limited 
circumstances.”  Id. at 410.  For example, federal law allows 
the Attorney General to enter into formal agreements with 
state or local governments that grant the authority to certain 
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officers to perform the tasks of federal immigration officers.  
Id. at 408–09 (citations omitted).  Absent such authorization, 
local officers are discouraged from involving themselves in 
immigration matters.  See id. at 407 (describing the usual 
process by which federal officials initiate removal 
proceedings). 
 
 This, however, does not bar law enforcement officers 
from ever inquiring into an individual’s immigration status.  
In Muehler v. Mena, the occupant of a home was detained 
while the police executed a search.  544 U.S. 93, 95 (2005).  
During that time, a federal immigration officer asked the 
occupant for her immigration documentation, even though the 
officer did not have an independent reasonable suspicion to 
question her about it.  Id. at 96.  The Supreme Court held that 
this did not violate her Fourth Amendment rights because 
“the Court of Appeals did not find that the questioning 
extended the time [she] was detained.”  Id. at 101.  Therefore, 
questioning about an individual’s immigration status does not 
violate the Fourth Amendment where the initial seizure of the 
individual is lawful and the questioning does not prolong the 
seizure.  However, officers may not stop an individual only to 
inquire about their immigration status, nor may they extend a 
stop for such an inquiry.  See Rajah v. Mukasey, 544 F.3d 
427, 441 (2d Cir. 2008) (“The Fourth Amendment does 
provide protection against random or gratuitous questioning 
related to an individual's immigration status.”). 
 
 With this background in mind, we turn to the facts of 
this case.  Although Macke was justified in initially stopping 
the van for speeding, the record supports Petitioners’ 
allegations that their Fourth Amendment rights were violated 
when Macke unreasonably extended the stop to investigate 
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their immigration status.  The declarations submitted on their 
behalf allege that Macke stopped the van between 7:40 and 
8:00 a.m.  The Forms I-213 state that he contacted ICE 
around 8:30 a.m.  The traffic citations were issued at 8:57 
a.m., Petitioners were sent to the rest area, and ICE agents 
arrived about thirty minutes later.  Because Macke contacted 
ICE before the citations were issued, at least some of the time 
between the initial stop and the issuance of the citations was 
spent interrogating the passengers in the back of the van.  
Moreover, Petitioners’ and other passengers’ thirty-three 
minute detention after the issuance of the citations—which 
marked the end of “the seizure’s mission”—and before ICE’s 
arrival extended “beyond the time reasonably required to 
complete the mission of issuing a ticket for the violation.”  
Rodriguez, 135 S. Ct. at 1612, 1614 (citations and internal 
quotation marks omitted).  The Government does not allege 
that Macke had reasonable suspicion that any of the 
passengers were engaged in any criminal activity or that there 
were any safety concerns to address.  Furthermore, Macke 
lacked the authority to enforce civil immigration law.  See 
U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, Delegation of 
Immigration Authority Section 287(g) Immigration and 
Nationality Act (last updated Aug 10, 2018), 
https://www.ice.gov/287g (showing that Pennsylvania has no 
agreement with the federal government that would allow state 
agents to perform the functions of immigration officials).  
Therefore, Petitioners made a prima facie showing that the 
extension of the stop to investigate their status was 
unreasonable and in violation of the Fourth Amendment. 
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B. 
 We next determine whether the exclusionary rule 
applies to suppress the evidence gathered as a result of the 
violation so that it should not have been used in Petitioners’ 
civil removal proceedings.  The exclusionary rule “bars the 
prosecution from introducing evidence obtained by way of a 
Fourth Amendment violation.”  Davis v. United States, 564 
U.S. 229, 232 (2011).  Because the “sole purpose” of the rule 
“is to deter future Fourth Amendment violations,” the rule is 
only applied in “situations in which this purpose is thought 
most efficaciously served.”  Id. at 236–37 (citations and 
internal quotation marks omitted).  Initially, application of the 
rule was limited to federal officers in federal criminal 
proceedings.  See United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433, 443–
44 (1976).  However, the exclusionary rule has since been 
extended to state officers and state criminal proceedings.  See 
Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 223 (1960); Mapp v. 
Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 654 (1961).  Therefore, it is applicable in 
all criminal proceedings against federal, state, and local law 
enforcement.  See Janis, 428 U.S. at 445–47. 
 
 The issue before us is the extent to which the 
exclusionary rule should apply in civil removal proceedings 
where a state or local law enforcement officer is accused of 
violating a petitioner’s Fourth Amendment rights.  The 
Supreme Court first considered an analogous issue in United 
States v. Janis.  See id. at 447.  There, pursuant to a search 
warrant, local law enforcement discovered evidence that the 
plaintiff had violated gambling laws.  428 U.S. at 434–36.  In 
the ensuing criminal proceeding, the warrant was held to be 
invalid, and the evidence against the plaintiff was suppressed 
pursuant to the exclusionary rule.  Id. at 437–38.  The 
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plaintiff then initiated a civil tax proceeding, seeking a refund 
for the assessment made against him by the Internal Revenue 
Service based on his winnings from his illicit gambling 
activities, and moved to suppress the same evidence that had 
been seized pursuant to the invalid warrant.  Id. at 438. 
 
 In considering whether the exclusionary rule also 
applied in the civil tax proceeding, the Supreme Court 
weighed the deterrent effect of the rule in such proceedings 
against the social costs imposed by applying it there.  Id. at 
447–60.  As to deterrence, the Court first noted that state law 
enforcement officers were already “punished” by application 
of the exclusionary rule in the criminal proceedings.  Id. at 
448 (internal quotation marks omitted).  It reasoned that any 
additional deterrence provided by application of the rule in 
civil proceedings was marginal, and the extreme social costs 
of applying the rule in those settings—namely, “the societal 
interest in law enforcement by its proscription of what 
concededly is relevant evidence”—outweighed the deterrent 
effect.  Id. at 448–49, 453–54.  Additionally, the Court 
considered that the federal civil proceeding involved the 
enforcement of the law of a sovereign other than the one 
involved in the state criminal proceeding, stating that “the 
deterrent effect of the exclusion of relevant evidence is highly 
attenuated when the ‘punishment’ imposed upon the 
offending criminal enforcement officer is the removal of that 
evidence from a civil suit by or against a different sovereign.”  
Id. at 457–58.  It continued: 
 
This attenuation, coupled with the 
existing deterrence effected by the 
denial of use of the evidence by 
either sovereign in the criminal 
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trials with which the searching 
officer is concerned, creates a 
situation in which the imposition 
of the exclusionary rule sought in 
this case is unlikely to provide 
significant, much less substantial, 
additional deterrence.  It falls 
outside the offending officer’s 
zone of primary interest. 
Id. at 458.  Therefore, the Court held “that the judicially 
created exclusionary rule should not be extended to forbid the 
use in the civil proceeding of one sovereign of evidence 
seized by a criminal law enforcement agent of another 
sovereign.”  Id. at 460. 
 
 The Supreme Court again considered the Janis factors 
of deterrence and social costs in INS v. Lopez-Mendoza, 
where it was urged that the exclusionary rule should apply in 
civil deportation2 proceedings when the evidence supporting 
removal was gathered by federal immigration officers in 
violation of petitioner-aliens’ Fourth Amendment rights.  468 
U.S. at 1034, 1041.  At the outset, the Court noted the unique 
nature of deportation proceedings:  “A deportation proceeding 
is a purely civil action to determine eligibility to remain in 
this country, not to punish an unlawful entry.”  Id. at 1038.  
                                              
2 Lopez-Mendoza was decided before the Illegal Immigration 
Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, which 
replaced the term “deportation” with “removal.”  I.N.S. v. St. 
Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 315 (2001).  Therefore, the civil 
proceedings at issue here are no different from those that took 
place in Lopez-Mendoza. 
17 
 
Immigration judges are only able to order deportation, and the 
government’s only burden is showing identity and alienage.  
Id. at 1038–39. 
 
 The Court then turned to the likely deterrent effect of 
applying the exclusionary rule in deportation proceedings.  It 
acknowledged that because federal immigration officers are 
primarily concerned with using evidence in these specific 
proceedings, the rule could deter unlawful conduct.  Id. at 
1042–43.  However, the Court found that “several other 
factors significantly reduce the likely deterrent value of the 
exclusionary rule” in this setting.  Id. at 1043.  First, the 
person and identity of an individual are not suppressible in 
the same way as evidence probative of criminal conduct.  
Thus, the government will be able to meet its burden in some 
cases where there is “evidence gathered independently of, or 
sufficiently attenuated from, the original arrest.”  Id.  Second, 
federal immigration officers believe that it is highly unlikely 
that an individual will challenge the lawfulness of his or her 
arrest in removal proceedings.  Id. at 1044.  Because the 
consequences of the rare challenge are “trivial” to the 
arresting officer, he “is most unlikely to shape his conduct in 
anticipation of the exclusion of evidence at a formal 
deportation hearing.”  Id.  “Third, and perhaps most 
important, the INS has its own comprehensive scheme for 
deterring Fourth Amendment violations by its officers.”  Id.  
The Court explained that most arrests of undocumented aliens 
occur during workplace surveys where “[l]arge numbers of 
illegal aliens are often arrested at one time, and conditions are 
understandably chaotic.”  Id.  “To safeguard the rights of 
those who are lawfully present at inspected workplaces,” the 
INS created rules limiting agents’ ability to stop, interrogate, 
and arrest.  Id. at 1044–45.  Agents receive training on the 
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Fourth Amendment at the start of their employment and 
periodically throughout.  Id. at 1045.  Furthermore, the 
Department of Justice excludes evidence seized “through 
intentionally unlawful conduct . . . from the proceeding for 
which it was obtained,” and the INS investigates and punishes 
agents who commit Fourth Amendment violations.  Id.  
Although the Court conceded that these rules and practices 
“cannot guarantee that constitutional violations will not 
occur,” it concluded that they do “reduce the likely deterrent 
value of the exclusionary rule.”  Id. at 1045.  Finally, that 
value is further “undermined by the availability of alternative 
remedies for institutional practices by the INS that might 
violate Fourth Amendment rights.”  Id.  When an individual 
has standing to do so, he or she may challenge INS practices 
through an action against the agency for declaratory relief.  
Id. 
 
 The Court also determined that, on the other side of the 
equation, “the social costs of applying the exclusionary rule 
in deportation proceedings are both unusual and significant.”  
Id. at 1046.  First, application of the rule “in proceedings that 
are intended not to punish past transgressions but to prevent 
their continuance or renewal would require the courts to close 
their eyes to ongoing violations of the law.”  Id.  Second, the 
exclusionary rule “might significantly change and complicate 
the character of these proceedings,” which are “deliberately 
simple” and “streamlined to permit the quick resolution of 
very large numbers of deportation actions.”  Id. at 1048.  
Third, because federal immigration officers are currently not 
required to “compile elaborate, contemporaneous, written 
reports detailing the circumstances of every arrest,” applying 
the exclusionary rule to these proceedings could seriously 
burden these officers by requiring them to do “considerably 
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more.”  Id. at 1049.  Finally, because of the “crowded and 
confused” nature of INS arrests, application of the 
exclusionary rule might result in the exclusion of evidence 
that had been obtained lawfully.  Id. 
 
 Based on these factors, the five Justices in the Lopez-
Mendoza majority agreed that “the Janis balance between 
costs and benefits comes out against applying the 
exclusionary rule in civil deportation hearings.”  Id. at 1050.  
However, a plurality qualified this holding by reserving 
judgment about cases involving “Fourth Amendment 
violations by INS officers [that are] widespread” and 
“egregious violations of Fourth Amendment or other liberties 
that might transgress notions of fundamental fairness and 
undermine the probative value of the evidence obtained.”  Id. 
at 1050–51.  Four Justices dissented, each believing that the 
exclusionary rule should apply more generally in civil 
deportation proceedings.  See id. at 1051–52 (Brennan, J., 
dissenting); id. at 1052–60 (White, J., dissenting); id. at 1060 
(Marshall, J., dissenting) id. at 1060–61 (Stevens, J., 
dissenting).  Therefore, eight of the nine Justices—the four in 
the plurality and the four dissenting—agreed that the rule 
could apply in removal proceedings where an egregious or 
widespread Fourth Amendment violation occurred. 
 
 While the plurality of the Supreme Court in Lopez-
Mendoza did not offer further guidance on the enumerated 
possible exceptions, in Oliva-Ramos, we considered the 
import of the various opinions in Lopez-Mendoza and 
specifically rejected the BIA’s view that the portion of the 
opinion that set forth the exceptions was obiter dicta.  See 
Oliva-Ramos, 694 F.3d at 266, 271–72.  We stated that 
“where an alien can establish either of those two 
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circumstances, the plurality opinion can only be read as 
affirming that the remedy of suppression justifies the social 
cost.”  Id. at 271–72.  We then addressed what might 
constitute an “egregious” violation of the Fourth Amendment.  
In determining the standard that should apply, we reviewed 
the approaches taken by the Ninth and the Second Circuits.  
See id. at 276.  The former “considers whether the agents 
committed the violations deliberately or by conduct a 
reasonable officer should have known would violate the 
Constitution.”  Id. (quoting Orhorhaghe v. INS, 38 F.3d 488, 
493 (9th Cir. 1994)) (internal quotation marks omitted).  
Alternatively, the Second Circuit held that the exclusionary 
rule applies “if record evidence established either (a) that an 
egregious violation that was fundamentally unfair had 
occurred, or (b) that the violation—regardless of its 
egregiousness or unfairness—undermined the reliability of 
the evidence in dispute.”  Id. at 277 (quoting Almeida-Amaral 
v. Gonzales, 461 F.3d 231, 234 (2d Cir. 2006)) (internal 
quotation marks omitted).  That Court elaborated on the first 
prong, explaining that the focus should be “on the 
characteristics and severity of the offending conduct.”  Id. at 
278.  It added that “even where the seizure is not especially 
severe, it may nevertheless qualify as an egregious violation 
if the stop was based on race (or some other grossly improper 
consideration).”  Id. 
 
 Because the Ninth Circuit’s approach “would permit 
conduct that may be objectively reasonable based on 
directives of [DHS], but nevertheless result in routine 
invasions of the constitutionally protected privacy rights of 
individuals,” we adopted the Second Circuit’s approach “with 
slight modification.”  Id.  We stated that “evidence will be the 
result of an egregious violation within the meaning of Lopez-
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Mendoza, if the record evidence established either (a) that a 
constitutional violation that was fundamentally unfair had 
occurred, or (b) that the violation—regardless of its 
unfairness—undermined the reliability of evidence in 
dispute.”  Id. at 278.  We explained that the totality of the 
circumstances should be considered in making this 
determination and offered a non-exhaustive list of factors for 
agencies and courts to consider, including, for example, 
whether the seizure was “based on race or perceived 
ethnicity.”  Id. at 279.  We also stated that “most 
constitutional violations that are part of a pattern of 
widespread violations of the Fourth Amendment would also 
satisfy the test for an egregious violation.”  Id. at 280. 
 
C. 
 Here, we must determine the extent to which the 
exclusionary rule will apply in removal proceedings where a 
state or local law enforcement officer, rather than a federal 
immigration officer, is accused of violating a petitioner’s 
Fourth Amendment rights.  As noted above, since its holding 
in Lopez-Mendoza, the Supreme Court has expressed 
reluctance to have state and local officers engage in 
enforcement of federal immigration laws except to the extent 
that Congress has expressly allowed.  In Arizona v. United 
States, the Court held that three Arizona statutory provisions 
allowing these officers to enforce certain federal immigration 
laws were preempted by federal law.  567 U.S. at 392–93, 
416.  In doing so, the Court expressed concern over 
“disrupt[ing] the federal framework” put in place by 
Congress, which specifically provides for state and local 
officers to play a role in enforcement of certain federal 
immigration laws if the state or local government has a 
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formal agreement with the federal government.  Id. at 413; 
see also id. at 410.  Although preemption is not at issue in this 
case, we note that the factual distinction in this case that was 
not present in Lopez-Mendoza—namely, that the conduct of 
state or local law enforcement is at issue—was central to the 
Court’s ruling in Arizona v. United States. 
 
 As in Janis and Lopez-Mendoza, our balancing 
analysis begins with consideration of the exclusionary rule’s 
likely deterrent effect in removal proceedings where a state or 
local agent has violated the Fourth Amendment.  As in Lopez-
Mendoza, deterrence is reduced by the fact that the person 
and identity of an individual are not suppressible in these 
proceedings.  Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. at 1043.  Therefore, 
the government will likely be able to meet its burden using 
independent evidence of alienage in many cases.  Id.  The 
remainder of the Supreme Court’s deterrence analysis in 
Lopez-Mendoza, however, is specific to federal immigration 
officers and does not lend itself easily to state or local law 
enforcement.  If anything, the comparison might lead to the 
conclusion that there are fewer deterrents in place for local 
officials, such that application of the “full” exclusionary rule 
might be called for.  For example, state and local law officers 
are not trained to enforce the immigration laws, nor are they 
subject to the INS mechanisms that are in place to deter 
Fourth Amendment violations.  See id. at 1042–44; see also 
Sanchez, 885 F.3d at 788.  Furthermore, petitioners cannot 
seek declaratory relief against the federal agency to address 
the “institutional practices” of state and local officers that 
violate the Fourth Amendment.  See Lopez-Mendoza, 468 
U.S. at 1045; Sanchez, 885 F.3d at 788. 
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 However, state and local officers are already 
“punished” by the use of the exclusionary rule in criminal 
proceedings.  See Janis, 428 U.S. at 448 (internal quotation 
marks omitted).  Therefore, any additional deterrence 
provided by the rule in the federal immigration setting is 
marginal.  This marginal deterrence is further attenuated by 
the intersovereign nature of this case, since the application of 
the exclusionary rule against state and local law enforcement 
would result in “the removal of . . . evidence from a civil suit 
by or against a different sovereign.”  Id. at 457–58.  
Therefore, the “punishment” is “outside the offending 
officer’s zone of primary interest.”  Id. at 457–58 (internal 
quotation marks omitted); see also Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. 
at 1043 (“[T]he exclusionary rule is likely to be most 
effective when applied to . . . ‘intrasovereign’ violations.”); 
Lopez-Gabriel, 653 F.3d at 686 (8th Cir. 2011) (“The case for 
exclusion of evidence is even weaker where the alleged 
misconduct was committed by an agent of a separate 
sovereign.  If evidence were suppressed in a federal civil 
immigration proceeding, any deterrent effect on a local police 
officer would be highly attenuated.”). 
 
 The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals recently analyzed 
the deterrent value when local officials are involved and 
agreed that applying the “full” exclusionary rule “would 
clearly have some deterrent effect.”  Sanchez, 885 F.3d at 
789.  Nonetheless, it did not agree “that the likely additional 
deterrent value of the ‘full’ exclusionary rule, as opposed to 
the ‘egregious violation’ rule, is appreciable or substantial 
enough to justify its application.”  Id. (emphases in original).  
It reasoned that if an officer “detains or arrests someone 
based solely on a civil immigration violation,” i.e., without 
reasonable suspicion of criminal activity, in abuse of his legal 
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authority, the stop or seizure will “usually be egregious.”  Id.  
Thus, the Court concluded that use of the “full” exclusionary 
rule was unnecessary in order to deter unconstitutional 
conduct.  See id.   
 
 We agree that application of the “full” exclusionary 
rule in removal proceedings where a Fourth Amendment 
violation was committed by a state or local law enforcement 
officer “is unlikely to provide significant, much less 
substantial, additional deterrence.”  Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. 
at 1046 (quoting Janis, 428 U.S at 458) (internal quotation 
marks omitted).  And, as noted by the Fourth Circuit in 
Sanchez, sufficient additional deterrence can be provided by 
the two exceptions offered by the plurality of the Supreme 
Court in Lopez-Mendoza and adopted by this Court in Oliva-
Ramos if egregious or widespread. 
 
 On the social costs side of the balance, application of 
the exclusionary rule to cases where nonfederal law 
enforcement officials were the relevant actors would 
undoubtedly lead to the exclusion of relevant evidence, a cost 
the Supreme Court considered significant in Janis.  428 U.S. 
at 448–49.  Additionally, two of the considerations addressed 
in Lopez-Mendoza also apply, at least in part, here.  First, 
application of the exclusionary rule to these proceedings 
“would require the courts to close their eyes to ongoing 
violations of the law.”3  468 U.S. at 1046.  In Lopez-
                                              
3 This social cost is mitigated, however, by the fact that the 
Supreme Court has more recently held that “it is not a crime 
for a removable alien to remain present in the United States.”  
See Arizona v. United States, 567 U.S. at 407 (citation 
omitted). 
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Mendoza, the Court noted that it “has never before accepted 
costs of this character in applying the exclusionary rule,” and, 
where it has considered this type of cost, it “has firmly 
indicated that the exclusionary rule does not extend this far.”  
Id. (citations omitted).  Second, the exclusionary rule “might 
significantly change and complicate” what are otherwise 
“streamlined” proceedings.  Id. at 1048.  And, as noted by the 
Fourth Circuit in Sanchez, this second cost would be 
magnified if different rules applied based on the nature of the 
authorizations that various state and local law enforcement 
may have to enforce immigration laws.  885 F.3d at 789.  If 
faced with a violation by a state and local officer whose 
sovereign government has a formal, written agreement with 
the federal government, immigration courts would apply the 
rule of Lopez-Mendoza.  Id.  However, in the absence of such 
an agreement, those courts would be tasked with applying a 
different rule, namely, the “full” exclusionary rule.  Id.   
 
Therefore, applying the exclusionary rule in these settings 
would require IJs to determine the 
level of authority a given state or 
local official had to enforce 
federal immigration law and to 
decide which test applies where 
officers with different authorities 
jointly execute an immigration 
action.  It is often difficult to 
define these categories with 
clarity. 
Sanchez, 885 F.3d at 789 (citation omitted).  Placing this 
burden on immigration courts would undoubtedly interrupt 
these otherwise “deliberately simple” and “streamlined” 
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proceedings.  Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. at 1048.  Because the 
totality of these costs outweighs any marginal deterrence 
supplied by the “full” exclusionary rule’s application in this 
setting, we hold that the exclusionary rule is not generally 
available in removal proceedings where state or local law 
officers have violated the Fourth Amendment.  However, we 
hold that the Lopez-Mendoza exceptions also apply to state 
and local officers in these proceedings. 
 
D. 
With this standard in mind, we turn to the question of 
whether Petitioners have established an egregious or a 
widespread Fourth Amendment violation.  In removal 
proceedings, the alien bears the burden of proving a prima 
facie case that the evidence should be suppressed.  Matter of 
Tang, 13 I&N Dec. 691, 692 (BIA 1971).  When the alien 
satisfies his or her burden, the burden then shifts to the 
Government to “justify[] the manner in which it obtained its 
evidence.”  Id.  An evidentiary hearing is warranted where an 
alien alleges facts that state a violation of his or her Fourth 
Amendment rights and shows, through an affidavit, that the 
violation could be deemed to be egregious or widespread.  
See Zuniga-Perez v. Sessions, 897 F.3d 114, 125 (2d Cir. 
2018); Yanez-Marquez v. Lynch, 789 F.3d 434, 450 (4th Cir. 
2015) (“A petitioner must first provide an affidavit that, taken 
as true, could support a basis for excluding the evidence.  If 
the affidavit is sufficient, the petitioner is entitled to an 
opportunity to confirm those allegations in an evidentiary 
hearing.” (citations and internal quotation marks omitted) 
(emphasis in original)); Maldonado v. Holder, 763 F.3d 155, 
161–61 (2d Cir. 2014) (“Petitioners were required to proffer 
affidavits based on personal knowledge that, taken as true, 
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could support suppression.  Had their affidavits been 
sufficient, they would have had an opportunity to confirm 
those allegations in an evidentiary hearing.”); see also Oliva-
Ramos, 694 F.3d at 275 (“The IJ and the Board should have, 
but did not first determine whether agents violated Oliva-
Ramos’s Fourth Amendment rights and second, whether any 
such violations implicated the Lopez–Mendoza exception for 
being widespread or egregious.”). 
 
1. 
 Petitioners allege that Macke’s conduct was egregious 
because it was “based on their Hispanic appearance and the 
fact that they spoke Spanish.”  Br. for Petitioners at 25.  
Although they concede that “the initial stop may have been 
justified because the van in which Petitioners were passengers 
was allegedly speeding,” they argue that the constitutional 
violation began when Macke questioned and detained them 
and would not let the van leave after issuing the citations but, 
instead, ordered that it be driven to the rest area to await the 
ICE agents.  Id. at 17. 
 
 As noted above, we held in Oliva-Ramos that 
“evidence will be the result of an egregious violation within 
the meaning of Lopez-Mendoza, if the record evidence 
established either (a) that a constitutional violation that was 
fundamentally unfair had occurred, or (b) that the violation—
regardless of its unfairness—undermined the reliability of 
evidence in dispute.”  694 F.3d at 278.  In making this 
determination, we instructed “courts and agencies [to] adopt a 
flexible case-by-case approach” and consider the totality of 
the circumstances.  Id. at 278–79.  We also laid out the 
following non-exhaustive list of factors that may be 
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considered in this inquiry: “whether [the petitioner] can 
establish intentional violations of the Fourth Amendment”; 
“whether the seizure itself was so gross or unreasonable in 
addition to being without a plausible legal ground, (e.g., when 
the initial illegal stop is particularly lengthy, there is an 
unnecessary and menacing show or use of force, etc.)”; 
“whether improper seizures, illegal entry of homes, or arrests 
occurred under threats, coercion or physical abuse”; “the 
extent to which the agents reported to unreasonable shows of 
force”; and “whether any seizures or arrests were based on 
race or perceived ethnicity.”  Id. at 279. 
 
 We do not agree with the IJ and the BIA that 
Petitioners failed to allege a potentially egregious Fourth 
Amendment violation that would warrant an evidentiary 
hearing.  First, as we determined above, Macke’s extension of 
the stop was unreasonable and in violation of the Fourth 
Amendment.  Second, Petitioners’ allegations, if true, may 
show an egregious Fourth Amendment violation that would 
warrant application of the exclusionary rule because, as noted 
above, we specifically stated in Oliva-Ramos that “whether 
any seizures or arrests were based on race or perceived 
ethnicity” was a consideration in determining whether an 
egregious Fourth Amendment violation had occurred.  Id.  
Through their own declarations and the declarations of other 
passengers, Petitioners claim that Macke detained them and 
ordered them to travel to the rest area because they “all look 
Hispanic.”  E.g., Calel-Espantzay A. 212.  Although the 
Government’s Forms I-213 assert that Petitioners “claimed to 
be” citizens of other countries in their interactions with 
Macke, e.g., id. at 174, the declarations submitted by 
Petitioners simply state that they “did not have anything to 
give him” in response to his request for “immigration papers, 
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work permit, visa, passport, and ID,” e.g., id. at 211 (internal 
quotation marks omitted).  In fact, Macke’s request, as 
alleged by Petitioners, supports their claim that Macke 
continued the stop because of the passengers’ Hispanic 
appearance.  His demand for this type of documentation, prior 
to any interaction with the passengers in the rear of the van, 
shows an assumption on his part that the Petitioners and other 
passengers were not United States citizens, a conclusion he 
could have only come to based on their appearance. 
 
 The facts alleged by Petitioners, if supported by 
evidence, could support the conclusion that the illegal 
extension of the stop was solely “based on race or perceived 
ethnicity.”  Oliva-Ramos, 694 F.3d at 279.  Other facts 
alleged by Petitioners, if true, may also add to the 
“egregiousness” calculus.  See id. at 279 (instructing courts to 
consider the totality of the circumstances and explaining that 
the list of enumerated guiding factors is non-exhaustive).  
Petitioners aver that they were refused water and food and 
were not allowed to use the bathroom or turn on the van’s air 
conditioning while they were detained by Macke.  Depending 
on the actual evidence adduced, these facts could be 
considered evidence of coercion or use of force as part of the 
totality of the circumstances test. 
 
 Because Petitioners have identified a possible 
egregious Fourth Amendment violation, we conclude that the 
IJ erred in not granting their motion for a hearing to provide 
them with an opportunity to put forth evidence in support of 
their claim.  However, we take no position as to the merits of 
that claim.  Instead, we merely conclude that Petitioners 
should have been allowed to present evidence to support their 
argument that the misconduct in this case is egregious and 
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warrants suppression.  Therefore, we will remand to the BIA 
to remand to the IJ for an evidentiary hearing. 
 
2. 
 Petitioners also allege that Fourth Amendment 
violations like the one committed against them by Macke are 
widespread, thereby warranting suppression in this case.  
Their only supporting evidence of this—news articles 
published after the agency proceedings and while this appeal 
was pending that report on the allegedly “unconstitutional 
traffic stops by the Pennsylvania state police targeting 
Hispanic-looking men”—was not before the IJ or the BIA.  
Petitioners’ Reply in Support of Motion at 2.  They have 
moved to supplement the record on appeal with these articles.  
However, because our review is limited to “the administrative 
record on which the order of removal is based,” we are barred 
from reviewing them in the first instance. 4  8 U.S.C. § 
1252(b)(4)(A).  Instead, Petitioners may seek to introduce this 
evidence on remand at the evidentiary hearing. 
 
IV. 
 For the reasons discussed above, we will vacate the 
BIA’s February 23, 2018 orders, and we will remand to the 
BIA with instructions that it grant Petitioners’ request for an 
evidentiary hearing and that it conduct further proceedings 
consistent with this opinion. 
                                              
4 Accordingly, we will deny Petitioners’ motions to introduce 
this evidence on appeal. 
